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ARTICLES 
REGULATORY TAKINGS CHALLENGES TO 
HISTORIC PRESERVATION LAWS AFTER 
PENN CENTRAL 
J. Peter Byrne * 
The Penn Central' decision, in its most immediate concern, pro-
vided a legal framework within which local governments could en-
force historic landmark restrictions without a regular constitutional 
requirement to pay "just compensation." The decision amalgamated 
regulatory takings analysis of historic landmark restrictions to the 
familiar and tolerant federal standards for reviewing zoning. Affirm-
ing the importance of the public interest goals of historic preserva-
tion, the Court directed inquiry to whether sufficient economic po-
tential remained in the control of the property owner, given 
reasonable expectations at the time of her investment in the property. 
While the broader jurisprudential merits of Penn Central's approach 
to the Taking Clause have been the subject of wide debate, the con-
stitutional question of how much of an economic burden the owner 
of a landmark may be required to bear has received very little atten-
tion. Ironically, it is this question that very well may have been the 
Court's primary concern. 
This essay looks specifically at how Penn Central protects historic 
preservation regulation. The constitutional framework created by 
the decision has fostered a remarkable blossoming of historic preser-
vation as a major tool of urban land use regulation. Preservation 
could never have played this role without the insulation from consti-
tutional liability provided by the Penn Central Court, likewise, it 
could not have played this role if property owners had been denied 
* Professor, Georgetown University Law Center; Faculty Direc-
tor; Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute. 
1. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 
(1978). 
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all economic incentives to invest in the renovation and reuse of his-
toric properties. Penn Central appears to have crafted a balance be-
tween local control and individual rights that has nourished preserva-
tion. 
I. THE PENN CENTRAL DECISION AND ITS WAKE 
For this brief essay, only the shortest summary of the decision is 
necessary. New York City designated Grand Central Station a his-
toric landmark in 1965, pursuant to its Landmarks Preservation Law. 
The City's Landmarks Preservation Commission subsequently de-
nied as inappropriate the application of the owner, Penn Central, to 
build a tower more than 50 stories tall above the station. Penn Cen-
tral sued, claiming that the Commission had "taken" their property in 
violation of the Takings Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by 
denying such development as was otherwise permitted by New 
York's zoning laws. Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that 
there was no taking. The Court noted that regulatory takings cases 
involved "essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries," but also identified 
several factors that have "particular significance." Such factors are: 
1) the economic impact of the regulation on the owner; 2) the extent 
to which the regulation "has interfered with distinct investment 
backed expectations"; and 3) the "character of the governmental ac-
tion.,,2 The Court found that the denial of the permit did not restrict 
the owner's property rights by precluding economically beneficial 
use of the property, did not single out the owner to bear an unfair 
burden, and promoted the public interest. In reaching this decision, 
the Court viewed Grand Central Station as an entire property, which 
included the Transferable Development Rights (TDR's) created by 
the landmark designation. 
Penn Central was understood at all times to be a crucial constitu-
tional test for historic landmark protection laws and for historic pres-
ervation as land regulation more generally. The speakers at this con-
ference have captured much of the excitement and apprehension that 
the case generated.3 Penn Central constituted a great victory for 
2. Id. at 124. 
3. Not only the preservation activists were energized by the case. 
Some years ago, I dined with Daniel Gribbon and the late Charles 
Horsky, who had represented Penn Central, and asked them what 
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historic preservation. Moreover, it provided courts a basic approach 
to regulatory takings claims throughout the rise and fall of the con-
stitutional property rights movement that became such a prominent 
feature of the 1980's and 1990's. After considering various doc-
trinal alternatives based on per se rules, the Supreme Court again 
endorsed Penn Central as the dominant precedent in regulatory tak-
ings law in the important Tahoe Sierra decision.4 While this high 
constitutional drama has been playing out in courts and scholarly 
writing, largely in cases involving environmental protections, his-
toric preservation law has come of age in many cities, providing a 
strong and pervasive regulatory system for knitting together existing 
buildings and new development.s 
Penn Central not only set the federal constitutional standard 
for takings challenges to historic preservation, but the states have 
also uniformly followed it in interpretation of their own constitu-
tions. In 1993, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, reversing its 
initial decision, held that designating the Boyd Theater in Philadel-
phia as a historic landmark did not amount to a regulatory taking, 
citing the consensus since Penn Central. The court wrote, 
[I]n fifteen years since Penn Central, no other state 
has rejected the notion that no taking occurs when a 
state designates a building as historic. The decade 
and a half in which the Penn Central decision has en-
strategic considerations had led them to choose a regulatory takings 
suit rather than some other legal maneuver to get value from the ter-
minal site. Each replied with warm conviction that Penn Central had 
sued because the landmark restrictions were unfair and unconstitu-
tional. It is useful to recall that Penn Central had been in bankruptcy 
reorganization for many years, a heroic endeavor that gave birth to 
Amtrak. 
4. Tahoe Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 
535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
5. For example, when Penn Central was decided in 1978, 
Georgetown was the only historic district in Washington D.C. pro-
tected by regulations; today there are more than 30, along with other 
designated landmarks, extending protection to nearly 30% of the 
structures within the District. 438 U.S. at 104. 
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joyed widespread acceptance weighs against our re-
jecting the Penn Central analysis.6 
Rare, indeed, have been decisions since Penn Central where a court 
has found any aspect of historic preservation law to constitute a tak-
ing. Few cases are brought, and very few are successful. My re-
search found only two reported decisions since Penn Central (both 
from Maryland) in which a court found the imposition of a historic 
preservation restriction to amount to an unconstitutional taking.7 
This is striking, giving how hotly contested Penn Central itself was, 
and the substantial doubt, prior to Penn Central, whether landmark 
preservation without purchase would be upheld. 
Penn Central has served to effectively insulate historic preserva-
tion from regulatory takings challenges for three principal reasons. 
First, Penn Central eliminated a variety of the concerns about coer-
cive historic preservation regulations. Second, it directed attention 
to the value remaining in the property, and structures protected by 
preservation restrictions (as opposed to natural resources protected 
by environmental controls) nearly always have some economic value 
that a clever developer can exploit. Third, preservation ordinances 
have been drafted and administered in the light of Penn Central with 
sufficient flexibility to avoid constitutional confrontations. In gen-
eral, the market has once again adapted to new land use restrictions. 
II. ESSENTIAL LEGITIMACY OF LANDMARK PRESERVATION 
REGULATION 
Prior to Penn Central, courts had for some time accepted the idea 
that state and local historic preservation represented a legitimate ex-
ercise of the police power, but the issue was still being litigated.9 
6. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 
612,619 (Pa. 1993). 
7. Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D.Md. 
1996); Broadview Apartments Co. v. Comm'n for Historical & Ar-
chitectural Pres., 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
8. It is sobering to recall that as recently as 1966, the New York 
Court of Appeals had held that a six-month moratorium on the 
demolition of the Metropolitan Opera House, to permit purchase of 
the building by a newly created non-profit, was not within the police 
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Penn Central settled conclusively that historic preservation advances 
are an important public interest and thus fall within the police power: 
Because this Court has recognized, in a number of set-
tings' that States and cities may enact land use restrictions 
or controls to enhance the quality of life by preserving the 
character and desirable aesthetic features of a city, appel-
lants do not contest that New York City's objective of 
preserving structures and areas with special historic, ar-
chitectural, or cultural significance is an entirely permis-
sible governmental goal. They also do not dispute that 
the restrictions imposed on its parcel are appropriate 
means of securing the purposes of the New York City 
law. 10 
As a related matter, the Court's embrace of an essentially ad hoc, 
factual approach ended lingering discussion of whether historic pres-
power. Old Metro. Opera House Corp. v. City of New York, 224 
N.E.2d 700 (1966). Two years later, however, another New York 
court found it "no longer arguable" that the city had the power "to 
place restrictions on the use to be made by an owner of his property 
for the cultural and aesthetic benefit of the community." Sailor's 
Snug Harbor v. Platt, 288 N.Y.S.2d 314, 315 (1968). By then the 
authority for the proposition was fairly strong. See, e.g., Rebman v. 
City of Springfield, 250 N.E.2d 282 (1969); In re Opinion of the 
Justices, 128 N.E.2d 357 (1955). Congress had enacted the National 
Historic Preservation Act in 1966, which had declared it to be na-
tional policy that "the historical and cultural foundations of the Na-
tion should be preserved." 16 U.S.c. 470 (2000). The Supreme 
Court had found that historic preservation was a "public use" within 
the meaning of the Takings Clause in United States v. Gettysburg 
Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 
33 (1954), equated the scope of "public use" as a requirement for 
eminent domain with the scope of the police power, while finding 
that the latter authorized legislative authority "to determine that the 
community should be beautiful as well as healthy." 
9. Courts still found it necessary to declare that historic preserva-
tion was a legitimate purpose of regulation in A-S-P Assoc. v. City 
of Raleigh, 258 S.E.2d 444 (N.C. 1979), and Maher v. City of New 
Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 905 
(1976). 
10. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 129. 
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ervation restrictions effected a categorical taking because they se-
cured a public benefit rather than prevented a public harm. The 
harmJbenefit distinction had previously been seen as an analytical 
tool that could help distinguish where the government was acting 
under its eminent domain power, rather than police power, and there-
fore owed the property owner compensation. Under this distinction 
the government was exercising police power, requiring no compen-
sation to a property owner, when it was protecting the public health, 
safety or welfare from harmful conduct, where a regulation sought to 
secure a public benefit, however, this was an exercise of eminent 
domain, requiring compensation. II Historic preservation had been 
thought difficult, or at least awkward, to classify as prevention of 
palpable harm to the public. Penn Central, reflecting contemporary 
jurisprudential thinking, dismissed the harmJbenefit distinction as 
unimportant. 12 Having found that historic preservation was em-
braced by the police power, the Court proceeded to examine the ef-
fect of the ordinance on the property owner,13 and developed the rule 
that historic regulators need pay compensation only when the eco-
nomic effect on the owner was severe. 
Removing a final conceptual hurdle, the Court found that landmark 
designations should not be subjected to more skeptical takings 
analysis on the claim that they single out individual properties to 
11. See, e.g., Alison Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for 
City Planning, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 651 (1958). 
12. Citing the classic article by Joseph Sax, Takings and The Po-
lice Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964), the Court stated that the prece-
dents "are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'nox-
ious' quality of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the 
restrictions were reasonably related to the implementation of a pol-
icy - not unlike historic preservation - expected to produce a wide-
spread public benefit and applicable to all similarly situated prop-
erty." 438 U.S. at 134. See also Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 
U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992). 
13. Ironically, Penn Central's inquiry into the "nature of the gov-
ernment's action," which seems in context only to consider the intru-
siveness of the legal instrument chosen by government to achieve its 
purpose, such as prohibition of demolition rather than physical occu-
pation, has come in later lower court cases to invite a weighing of 
the importance of the governmental interest. This invites some 
pragmatic reconstruction of the harmlbenefit distinction. 
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bear unique burdens without any offsetting benefits. This had been 
thought to be the strongest argument for the landmark owner because 
it distinguished historic landmark restrictions from zoning or historic 
district regulations, where each property was simultaneously bur-
dened and benefited by the same regulation. By contrast, the land-
mark owner is burdened by more onerous restrictions than his 
neighbors, and receives an uncertain benefit from other landmarks in 
the city.14 The Court, however, dismissed this concern, finding that 
New York's landmark program was a comprehensive plan to pre-
serve structures of historic or aesthetic interest wherever they might 
be found in the city!5 While the Court's point does answer concerns 
about singling out the landmark owner capriciously or invidiously, it 
fails to address the argument that the owner must bear an economic 
loss different in kind from other regulated land owners, as Justice 
Rehnquist tellingly emphasized in his dissent. 16 The real answer to 
the landmark owner is that the Takings Clause protects him only 
from the narrow class of losses discerned through the Court's ad hoc 
mqumes. 
Penn Central thus barred categorical or qualitative arguments that 
historic preservation regulations, including those of landmarks, were 
takings. Rather, it affirmed preservation regulation to be an impor-
tant governmental function. Future regulatory takings claims against 
historic regulation must focus on the specific economic conse-
14. See John Costonis, SPACEADRIFf; LANDMARK PRESERVATION 
AND THE MARKETPLACE 18-19 (1974). 
15. Penn Cent. Transp., 438 U.S. at 132. 
16. Rehnquist viewed historic districts as distributing costs and 
benefits much like zoning: each property in the district is both bur-
dened and specially benefited. [d. at 147. By contrast, for a land-
mark, the cost is "uniquely felt and is not offset by any benefits 
flowing from the preservation of some 400 other 'landmarks' in New 
York City." [d. An irony of Rehnquist's dissent is that it put chal-
lenges to historic districts entirely beyond the pale of constitutional 
argument. /d. Land marking is interestingly referred to as a "non-
zoning use of the police power" in the note, The Police Power, Emi-
nent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic Property, 63 COLUM. 
L. REV. 708, 722 (1963). The paradigmatic example of an exercise 
of the police power outside zoning is nuisance regulation, in which 
the burden on the owner is justified by the harm the nuisance unjusti-
fiably imposes on others. 
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quences of specific decisions about an owner's proposed changes in 
the historic fabric. 
III. Focus ON REMAINING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL 
Penn Central focused analytically on whether the owner of a his-
toric landmark can still put the property to some reasonable eco-
nomic use. That this standard tends to protect historic preservation 
is hardly surprising, since it was fashioned in a historic preservation 
dispute. But it is useful to specify the ways it is helpful. 
Landmark protection, particularly in urban cores, will tend to de-
press the value of a property, at least in the short tenn, whenever it 
prohibits a full build-out to the zoning envelope. As in Penn Cen-
tral, this loss can be large, whether measured in dollars or lost FAR. 
While Penn Central's inquiry is articulated broadly in tenns of 
"economic impact," the Court actually looks only to the constitu-
tional sufficiency of what the owner continues to retain. Only the 
solvency of the investment in the retained rights, and not the 
magnitude of precluded opportunity, provides a measure of loss. 
Moreover, the Court makes clear that it weighs the potential value of 
the retained rights, not their current or short-tenn net income posi-
tion. This last point is particularly significant for landmarks, be-
cause it channels thinking toward creative reuse of the building. 
Historic preservation regulations typically do not restrict the uses 
to which an owner can put her property; rather, they primarily pro-
tect original exterior architectural features. Developers have shown 
themselves increasingly imaginative in fashioning new and profit-
able uses for historic buildings. Architects have developed convinc-
ing approaches to incorporating historic fabric into significant ex-
pansions of landmark sites that qualitatively improve on Breuer's 
justly ridiculed "aesthetic joke.,,17 In these circumstances, it is rare 
17. See generally Paul Byard, THE ARCHITECTURE OF ADDITIONS 
(1998). A favorite example of mine is the fonner Masonic Temple 
in Washington, which now houses the Gallup Organization, in which 
a modem tower is joined to an authentically restored three story 
building by a playful atrium. Historic Masonic Temple Rehabilita-
tion in Washington, DC Wins Two Prestigious Industry Awards, at 
http://www.karchem.com/sections/company/news_awdl.html (last 
viewed May 1, 2004). The previous owner claimed for years that the 
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that a historic property will be divested of all economic value or that 
a developer will be denied the possibility of a reasonable return. IS 
Other cases amplify the nature of the economic showing that the 
owner must make. A property owner will not be able to prove a 
regulatory taking if he cannot show that the sale of the property was 
impracticable, that commercial rental could not provide a reasonable 
rate of return, or that other potential use of the property was fore-
closed.I9 It will be difficult for a property owner to show that a his-
toric building has no reasonable economic use, since an historic 
preservation ordinance does not foreclose any use of the historic 
property. For example, in the District of Columbia a claim brought 
by the owner of a designated landmark failed where evidence existed 
that the property could have been rented "as is," with minimal reno-
vation, or with full renovations, which were possible at a lower cost 
than claimed by the petitioner.2o In any such case the burden of 
proof will be on the owner plaintiff. 
That the standards for economic hardship have grown more severe 
over time is illustrated by comparing another pair of cases from the 
District of Columbia. In the first significant court interpretation of 
the DCHP A, the Court of Appeals upheld the determination of the 
"Mayor's Agent," an administrative law judge who determines 
whether demolition of a landmark is permissible as a "project of 
special merit," and found that the fabled Rhodes Tavern could be 
demolished to build a first class office building across from the 
Treasury?I One factor identified by the Mayor's Agent and relied 
on by the court was the cost to the developer of retaining Rhodes 
Tavern in the new project. The Court plainly worried that requiring 
building could not be renovated on an economic basis. See 900 G St. 
Assoc. v. DHCD, 430 A.2d 1387, 1392 (D.C. 1981). 
18. Historic preservation could generate more takings if there was 
an aggressive program to preserve through regulation cultural land-
scape, such as meadows or pastures produced through traditional 
farming techniques. New York City's preservation law permits des-
ignation of landscape features only when found on city-owned prop-
erty. 
19. Maher v. City of New Orleans, 516 F.2d 1051, 1066 (5th Cir. 
1975). 
20. 900 G St. Assoc., 430 A.2d at 1392. 
21. Citizens Comm. to Save Historic Rhodes Tavern v. D.C. 
Dep't of Hous. & Comm. Dev., 432 A.2d 710 (1981). 
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an owner to bear substantial costs to preserve an historic structure 
was illegitimate.22 By contrast, in a more recent case, the court re-
versed the Mayor's Agent for relying on cost as a factor in permit-
ting demolition without finding that it met the statutory standard for 
economic hardship.23 The cost to the developer was essentially 
brushed aside with the observation that "[ w ] here the economic bur-
den of maintaining and preserving a historic building is onerous, the 
Preservation Act provides an owner with the opportunity to seek 
demolition on the separate ground of 'unreasonable economic hard-
ship. ",24 The legal development charted here reflects a greater 
acceptance of the notion that owners should bear the costs of preser-
22. Consequently, it was entirely proper for the Mayor's Agent to 
consider evidence offered by interveners showing that preservation 
of all three structures would cost upward of $7.2 million. Absent 
public funding, it is apparent that petitioner expects interveners to 
bear this cost alone and that, if they do, demolition of Rhodes Tavern 
will not be necessary. However, as one court has stated: 'It is laud-
able to attempt to preserve a landmark; however, it becomes uncon-
scionable when an unwilling private party is required to bear the ex-
pense.' ... Requiring private parties to spend substantial sums of 
money to preserve landmark structures-with little or no public as-
sistance--could rise to the level of an unconstitutional taking. 
Moreover, development-so vital to a city's growth--could be sty-
mied irreparably. By placing the costs of architectural preservation 
squarely on the landmark owner, design and demolition controls may 
actually discourage private citizens from purchasing and maintaining 
landmark property. Failure to offset the economic burdens of land-
mark designation will 'create a class of buildings which will be 
shunned like lepers. ' 
[d. at 716. (citations omitted). 
23. Comm. of 100 on the Fed. City v. D.C. DCRA, 571 A.2d 195 
(1990). The court stated, "[t]he issue is not whether a Class "B" 
building can command the level of rents necessary to justify the ex-
pense of renovation, but whether demolition of the Woodward 
Building and the historic values statutorily ascribed to buildings lo-
cated within historic districts is justified by the cost of renovation 
and by the benefits which the new building would bring to the com-
munity." [d. at 203. 
24. [d. at 202. 
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vation, so long as their investment retains a reasonable prospect of 
profit. 
There are a number of reasons why courts and administrators are 
becoming more comfortable with developers bearing the costs of 
historic preservation. The scope of the police power and consequent 
justification for limiting an owner's property rights have always de-
pended on social norms, so that new grounds for restriction raise 
much greater resistance than familiar ones. Euclid itself emphasized 
that restrictions that may have been objectionable to earlier genera-
tions now seem perfectly appropriate.25 As noted above, aesthetic 
goals have become an acceptable goal for land development regula-
tion. So, too, historic preservation has become a "normal" feature of 
urban land regulation, and the real estate market has adjusted to the 
costs and opportunities that preservation provides. Penn Central 
was the indispensable step in creating the safe harbor within which 
historic protection could become "normal." 
At the same time, there are at least two other legal developments 
that have inured decision-makers to the complaints of landmark 
owners. First, tax credits. Beginning with the Tax Reform Act of 
1976, the federal government has provided a credit for the costs of 
rehabilitation and favorable terms for depreciation of the costs of 
rehabilitation.26 This provides "compensation," in the very broadest 
25. In its landmark decision upholding comprehensive zoning, the 
Court stated: 
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; 
but with the great increase and concentration of popula-
tion, problems have developed, and constantly are devel-
oping, which require, and will continue to require, addi-
tional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of 
private lands in urban communities. Regulations the 
wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to ex-
isting conditions, are so apparent that they are now uni-
formly sustained, a century ago, or even a half century· 
ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and 
oppressIve. 
ViII. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386 (1926). 
26. Garvin, p. 491. Chicago Landmarks lists the range of current 
federal and state tax incentives on its website, CityofChicago.com, at 
www.cityofchicago.org/landmarks/Preservation.htrnl (last viewed 
May 1,2004). 
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sense, as well as important incentives, for developers taking on the 
burdens of rehabilitation. Second, the practice of local governments 
of requiring developers to pay for infrastructure and amenities in the 
land development process became ubiquitous and its constitutional-
ity, within broad restraints, is now settled.27 The pervasiveness of 
such exactions normalized the notion that development required 
some kind of bargain between the developer and the regulatory au-
thority, wherein the developer should compensate the public for the 
costs broadly attributable to new development. When developers 
must provide the wherewithal for new parks, schools, or affordable 
housing on the urban perimeter, it seems less onerous to require 
them to bear the costs of preserving historic fabric within the center. 
In considering the elements that have insulated historic protections 
from successful takings claims, one device notable for its absence is 
transferable development rights. Penn Central's ability to transfer 
its unused development air rights to neighboring properties undoubt-
edly was an important factor in the Court's conclusion that New 
York's rejection of the addition did not work a taking. Indeed, a 
major point of disagreement between the majority and Justice 
Rehnquist in dissent concerned whether TDR's should be seen as 
retained value in deciding whether a taking had occurred or only as 
compensation for a taking, a disagreement that has reverberated in 
subsequent decisions. In any case, TDR's have not proven indispen-
sable, or even common, in practice. TDR's have been used some-
what to mitigate losses to owners caused by severe development re-
strictions imposed on environmentally sensitive lands, such as at 
Lake Tahoe in Nevada and in the Pinelands of New Jersey. But 
there is little evidence of widespread use of TDR's to support his-
toric landmark protections outside New York City.28 
The difficulty for an owner seeking to prevail in an historic preser-
vation takings case is illustrated by the interesting case of District 
Intown Properties v. District of Columbia.29 Plaintiff owned a 
27. See generally Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 825 (1994); 
Ehrlich v. City of Culver, 911 P.2d 429 (1996). 
28. TDR's were important in the effort to preserve historic thea-
ters in New York and helped protect theater land marking against a 
takings challenge. See Shubert Org. v. Landmarks Pres. Comm'n, 
570 N.Y.S.2d 504, 507 (1991). 
29. Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia 198 F.3d 874 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812 (2000). 
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prominent apartment building, Cathedral Mansions, and wished to 
build town houses on the extensive lawns between the building and 
Connecticut A venue. If it had simply sought a permit and been de-
nied, a subsequent takings claim would easily have been defeated, 
because the property as a whole retained very substantial value. 
However, the plaintiff subdivided the property into nine contiguous 
lots before the city designated the entire property an historic land-
mark. When the owner sought permits to build on eight of the lots 
and was denied, it claimed that the application of the regulations 
denied him all the economic value of those lots in violation of Lucas 
v. South Carolina Coastal Commission.3o Owners of historic proper-
ties rarely have plausible Lucas claims because preservation ordi-
nances do not forbid all uses of a property, as compared with envi-
ronmental regulations of the type involved in Lucas, which forbade 
any permanent structures on vacant lots. Even a historic battlefield 
can be farmed, although in practice such sites are likely to be pur-
chased to permit public access. The owner in District [ntown clev-
erly tried to create a Lucas case by breaking off the historic lawns 
from the apartments, and formally placing them in separate lots, 
which the Board would not allow to be developed. Thus, after des-
ignation there would be parcels of which no economic use could be 
made. The owner failed, however, when the court concluded that the 
relevant parcel for takings analysis was the entire original complex, 
given how long it had held them as one and the notice of new regula-
tion at the time of the subdivision?! Owners of historic properties 
rarely will own buildings of which no economic use can be made. 
This difficulty can be understood more fully in considering the two 
reported cases in which owners prevailed in regulatory takings 
claims against application of historic preservation restrictions. 
Keeler v. Mayor & City Council of Cumberlantf2 involved that 
city's rejection of a petition by a Roman Catholic church to demolish 
a historic monastery. The takings finding stood on the fact that the 
City had stipulated that no economically feasible plan could be for-
mulated for the preservation of the Church buildings. 33 This proba-
30. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
31. Dist. [ntown Props., 198 F.3d at 880-82. 
32. 940 F. Supp. 879 (D.Md. 1996). 
33. [d. at 888. The decision may have been influenced by the ad-
ditional holding that application of the ordinance violated the 
church's right to the free exercise of religion. [d. at 886-87. 
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bly was not true in fact, since the church could have sold the monas-
tery, which might have been converted to a hotel or other use. But, 
in any event, the ill-advised concession by the city led the Court to 
conclude that Lucas applied. 
The difficult case is one in which the historical building is so dere-
lict that the cost of renovation for safe use exceeds its market poten-
tial. The owner in Broadview Apartments Co. v. Commission for 
Historical and Architectural Preservation34 prevailed on such a tak-
ings claim, when the City of Baltimore did a poor job of contesting 
the owner's experts' cost and value estimates. Certainly, there may 
be instances where buildings in undesirable locations cannot gener-
ate a rental income that can justify historic renovation, but that lack 
of demand often will mean that no one wants to do anything at all 
with the site, which can "mothball" a building. But owners will find 
it difficult to win such cases; they never would amount to a per se 
taking as in Lucas, but would require detailed economic analysis of 
costs and benefits in a particular factual context. The overwhelming 
fact is that there is no other reported decision in which a local pres-
ervation agency seriously contested the economic viability of restor-
ing a building and lost a subsequent takings claim. Historic preser-
vation staff and lawyers have learned a great deal in the twenty plus 
years since Broadview Apartments. There are many devices for pre-
venting such a conclusion, such as bundling the derelict house with 
new compatible structures on the same site, so that revenue from the 
new buildings will support renovation of the 01d.35 
Finally, Penn Central also brought to frustration of distinct in-
vestment backed expectations to the center of attention for economic 
analysis. The useful and familiar argument here is that the owner 
bought the designated property subject to historic controls and could 
have no reasonable expectation that he could build in disregard of 
34. 433 A.2d 1214 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981). 
35. This was done to save a magnificent but decrepit townhouse, 
known as the Louise, that had stood vacant on 7th St. NE, in Wash-
ington, D.C., for many years. The developer included restoration of 
the building as part of a project that included 17 new townhouses, in 
part to secure neighborhood good will. After the fact, the developer 
indicated that the restoration had paid for itself and increased the 
sales value of the entire project. CAPITOL HILL RESTORATION SOC'Y, 
NOMINATION OF HOLLADAY CORPORATION FOR A MAYOR'S AWARD 
FOR EXCELLENCE IN HISTORIC PRESERVATION (2003). 
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them; indeed the price paid should have reflected limits on that use?6 
After Palazzolo v. Rhode Island/7 it is clear that becoming an owner 
after an ordinance goes into effect will not defeat a takings claim per 
se, but it is highly likely that it will defeat nearly all such claim in 
which the current owner bought in a normal market transaction after 
designation. A good example is Weinberg v. City of Pittsburgh?8 
There, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld a finding of no 
unreasonable hardship, in part because the owner had bought the 
designated landmark with full knowledge of existing historical con-
trols. The court reversed the contrary finding by the Commonwealth 
Court, which had held that the purchaser had reasonably underesti-
mated the cost of renovation. But the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
placed the burden of that mistake squarely on the shoulders of the 
purchaser: "The fact that they did not engage the services of an ar-
chitect or contractor to estimate the cost or feasibility of restoring the 
Gateway House cannot serve as a basis for their claims of economic 
hardship after the fact. ,,39 
On the other hand, purchase before designation may still not give 
rise to reasonable expectations of development to the limits of exist-
ing zoning when the probability of designation is or should be 
known. In District Intown, the owner subdivided the lawn lots in 
1979 and sought permits to construct the new buildings before the 
property was designated a landmark. The court found, however, 
after 1979, D.C.'s historic landmark laws additionally 
limited expectations of development. Thus, at the time 
District Intown subdivided the property, it knew, or 
should have known, that the property was potentially sub-
ject to regulation under the landmark laws ... Businesses 
that operate in an industry with a history of regulation 
have no reasonable expectation that regulation will not be 
strengthened to achieve established legislative ends. See 
Concrete Pipe & Prods. v. Construction Laborers Pen-
sion Trust, 508 U.S. 602, 645 (1993). In this case, Dis-
trict Intown was in the real estate business, with a history 
of restriction of development for the purpose of preserv-
36. E.g., 900 G St. Assoc. v. DHCD, 430 A.2d 1387, 1390 (D.C. 
1981). 
37. 533 U. S. 608 (2001). 
38. 676 A.2d. 207 (1996). 
39. Id. at 213. 
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ing historic sites .... Prior to and after subdivision, this 
particular property was the subject of increasing public 
activity devoted to restricting development through land-
mark designation.4o 
Historic preservation laws actually shape the reasonable expecta-
tions of owners of undesignated properties more definitely than do 
the laws considered in the precedents relied on by the District [n-
town court. In the latter instances, owners found their property regu-
lated to a comparatively mild degree when they made investments, 
but the regulations were strengthened by subsequent generally appli-
cable legislative amendments. For example, the owner in Good v. 
United States41 bought his property at a time when he could fill his 
wetlands for development with only minor regulatory hurdles, but 
held it while Congress and agencies made it much more difficult to 
obtain a permit to do so; the court held that he could not claim unfair 
surprise because he had "watch [ ed] as the applicable regulations got 
more stringent, before taking any steps to obtain the required ap-
proval.,,42 In a historic preservation case like District [ntown, the 
regulatory structure already was in place when the subdivision was 
made; what had not yet occurred was the landmark designation of 
the particular property. No owner of a property eligible for designa-
tion under an existing preservation ordinance should be seen to have 
a reasonable expectation to develop free of historic protections. The 
criteria for and practice of past designations should make it clear 
whether a petition to designate will succeed.43 
-Moreover, there are specific features of historic preservation law 
that must shape an owner's reasonable expectations before designa-
tion. The National Historic Preservation Act extends its protective 
consideration of the impact of federal "undertakings" over all prop-
erties eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic 
40. Dist. Intown Props. v. District of Columbia 198 F.3d 874 
(D.C. Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 812, 833-34 (2000). 
41. 189 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
42. [d. at 1362. 
43. The District [ntown court, for example, noted that "almost the 
entire length of Connecticut A venue from M Street to almost a mile 
north of District Intown's property is either land marked or within a 
historic district." 198 F.3d at 884. Expectations would be different, 
of course, in a benighted jurisdiction that requires the consent of the 
owner for designation. 
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Places, whether or not they have been actually designated for inclu-
sion.44 Also, local ordinances often provide that the filing of a peti-
tion for designation stays issuance of a demolition permit to allow 
the petition to be weighed on the merits,45 thus continuing the public 
policy of protecting even undesignated properties by historic preser-
vation laws. Now that every state and nearly every locality has such 
laws on their books, developers must adjust to the regulatory envi-
ronment. In some fundamental way the property baseline has 
moved. 
There is an additional argument about the reasonable expectations 
of the owner of a historic property that complements the point that 
owners should anticipate now-ubiquitous preservation restrictions. 
Historical structures embody settled expectations. By definition al-
most, historic properties are those constructed and long used for par-
ticular purposes that more or less fulfilled the original expectations 
of their creators. When the original owner continues in ownership of 
the property, as Penn Central did Grand Central Station, a court is 
likely to conclude, as the Penn Central Court did, that the restriction 
precluding new construction "does not interfere with what must be 
regarded as [the owner's] primary expectation regarding the use of 
the parcel.,,46 The historic structure and use determine the "primary 
expectation" for the original owner, and new expectations face the 
hurdle of identifying some new significant investment at a point in 
time later than the original acquisition. This is an even more serious 
hurdle for enduring non-profit organizations, such as churches and 
endowed schools. Not only will such an organization often be an 
original owner who has long persisted in a particular use, but also 
the test of economic harm such owner must meet is whether the re-
striction prevents the organization from carrying out that purpose in 
its current facilities. 47 District Intown indicates that not only original 
44. 16 U.S.c. §§ 470, 470f (2000). 
45. See, e.g., D.C. Code, § 6-1102(6). 
46. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 136 
( 1978) (emphasis added). 
47. See Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 
914 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 905 (1991); 
Soc'y for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 415 N.E. 2d 922, 936 (N.Y. 1980) 
("There is no genuine complaint that eleemosynary activities within 
the landmark are wrongfully disrupted, but rather the complaint is 
instead that the landmark stands as an effective bar against putting 
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owners but also purchasers who persist in the original uses face the 
hurdle of a court concluding that a new development is not a signifi-
cant part of their investment backed expectations.48 
IV. INCENTIVE FOR ACCOMMODATION 
Penn Central did not leave the property owner defenseless. The 
fact that there are very few reported cases in which property owners 
have prevailed in regulatory takings claims against historic protec-
tions does not mean that the constitutional provision plays no role. 
The threat of liability to municipalities plays a much larger role in 
the land use regulation process than do any actual recoveries.49 The 
property owner can argue that some regulation goes too far, and the 
regulator often will find it difficult to dismiss the likelihood of liabil-
ity given the vague and sometimes contradictory factors at play. 
Thus, the regulator nearly always has some incentive to find a com-
promise that preserves the essentials of a historic resource while 
permitting adaptation for a remunerative use. 
As noted above, historic preservation law is well suited for this 
kind of negotiated regulation. First, it does not in principle restrict 
the uses to which a property may be put, but only restricts demoli-
the property to its most lucrative use."). See also Cindy Moy, Re-
formulating the New York City Landmarks Preservation Law's Fi-
nancial Hardship Provision: Preserving the Big Apple, 14 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L. J. 447 (1996). 
48. "Here, as in Penn Central, the regulation does not interfere 
with District Intown's "primary expectation" concerning the use of 
the parcel, because it "not only permits but contemplates that appel-
lants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used" 
for the past 28 years." Dist. [ntown Props., 198 F.3d at 136. 
49. Justice Stevens captured the dilemma in noting how allowing 
damages actions for overreaching land use regulations can over deter 
appropriate regulation: "Cautious local officials and land-use plan-
ners may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and 
thus give rise to a damages action. Much important regulation will 
never be enacted, even perhaps in the health and safety area." First 
English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los 
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 340-41 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(footnote omitted). 
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tion or alteration of existing designated properties, usually only on 
the exterior. Indeed, preservationists often seek a relaxation of zon-
ing rules to permit reuse of buildings to serve current market de-
mand. A classic example of this phenomenon is New York City's 
rezonin~ of cast iron lofts in SOHO for residential purposes in the 
1970's. 0 Secondly, even in preserving exterior fabric, some change 
is often permissible, as the legal standards for alterations or addi-
tional construction are based on notions of "appropriateness" or 
"compatibility." Since the era of Breuer, architects have progressed 
impressively in creating imaginative and contextual designs for addi-
tions to landmarks or for new construction in historic districts.51 Fi-
nally, historic preservation does not require in principle a single-
minded devotion to total domination of land development decisions 
by preservation values. While there certainly are cases where any 
significant alterations simply are unacceptable because they seri-
ously diminish an important landmark, there are many more cases 
where some less critical historic fabric can be sacrificed to achieve 
broader development goals, or simply to cut a workable dea1.52 One 
50. See Garvin, supra note 26, at 489-90. 
51. Permission for additions may sometimes go beyond compati-
bility. The D.C. Historic Preservation Act permits demolition of a 
landmark to permit construction of a "project of special merit," D.C. 
Code, § 6-11 04( e), based on its "exemplary architecture," D.C. 
Code, § 6-1102(10). The D.C. Mayor's Agent recently approved 
under this provision demolition of a portion of the landmark Cor-
coran Gallery to permit construction of a new addition in flamboyant 
design by Frank Geary. In re Corcoran Gallery of Art, HPA 02-284 
(Sept. 19, 2002), available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edulhistpres/ 
decisions/hpa02-284summ.html 
52. An interesting example of this in the District is the final ap-
proval of an office tower at 10th and F Streets, NW, adjacent to the 
landmark St. Patrick's Catholic Church. After an initial proposal to 
demolish seven nineteenth century stores, except for their facades on 
F Street was rejected by the Historic Preservation Review Board and 
the Mayor's Agent, In re Archdiocese of Washington, HPA 99-219, 
et al (Nov. 9, 1999), available at http://www.ll.georgetown.edu/ 
histpres/decisions/results.cfm, the Planning Office initiated a media-
tion process that resulted in approval of a new plan as a project of 
special merit that preserved four of the stores to a depth of 50 feet, 
along with the facades of two others and removed the mass of the 
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must rely on a flexible process involving expert consideration and 
meaningful public comment to sort out these instances. 53 
The rights of the property owners typically are incorporated into 
the historic preservation ordinance itself. Many contain an excep-
tions clause that prohibits enforcement of preservation mandates 
when doing so would impose severe economic hardship on the 
owner. New York City provides that an owner may be able to obtain 
a certificate of appropriateness for demolition or new construction 
on the ground of "insufficient return," which for a non-tax-exempt 
property is set legislatively at 6%.54 Such provisions provide that 
designated properties that cannot be economically used may be de-
molished, and create another check on the power of historic preser-
vation agencies. 
Some jurisdictions make this exception coterminous with the stan-
dard for a regulatory taking.55 In D.C., the statute itself provides 
that: "'[u]nreasonable economic hardship' means that the failure to 
issue a permit would amount to a taking of the owner's property 
without just compensation.,,56 This statute was drafted primarily by 
David Bonderman, who wrote an important brief for the National 
Trust and several cities in support of New York in Penn Central. 57 
office building to the comer of the block. In the Matter of the John 
Akridge Co, and the Archdiocese of Washington, HPA Nos. 01, 219, 
et al (August 1, 2001) (available at www.ll.georgetwon.edulhistpres/ 
decisions/hpaOI-219-224,208209.htm). While some historic stores 
will be demolished, they individually lack great significance. The 
regulators were able to preserve a last row of low-rise storefronts in 
downtown Washington, a notable preservation victory. 
53. Carol Rose long ago recognized that historic preservation in 
an urban context involves a process of community self-definition in 
which public participation and fair procedures may be more impor-
tant than substantive criteria. Carol M. Rose, Preservation and 
Community: New Directions in the Law Of Historic Preservation, 33 
STAN. L. REv. 473 (1981). 
54. N.Y.C. Admin. Code 25-302(v). 
55. E.g., lllinois ColI. of Surgeons v. City of Chicago, 153 F.3d 
356, 368 (7th Cir. 1998); United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. 
Philadelphia, 635 A.2d 612, 618 n.3 (Pa. 1993). 
56. D.C. Code § 6-1102 (14). 
57. See Jeremy Dutra, "You Can't Tear It Down:" the Origins of 
the D.C. Historic Preservation Act, 23-24 (2002), available at www. 
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Such an exceptions clause has two effects. First, it permits the 
owner to demolish a building in the unusual circumstances where 
there is no alternative use, thereby avoiding constitutional litigation. 
Officials should be able to assess the owner's case and adjust their 
requirements to permit adequate return for the owner on his invest-
ment. Second, it locates disputes about economic impact within the 
permitting process, giving initial control over fact-finding about 
economic harms and alternatives to the local preservation board. 
Under the Supreme Court's Williamson County doctrine, no private 
litigant would be allowed to pursue a takings claim in court without 
seeking relief under such a statutory hardship route. 58 Such a 
scheme usually creates a steeper hill for the takings claimant to 
mount. In the District of Columbia, no litigant has ever prevailed on 
a claim of economic hardship.59 
Given this legal terrain, developers interested in developing land-
marks have an incentive to propose developments that have some 
chance of approval. Bucking the system is costly and unlikely to 
prove rewarding. Regulators in tum have an incentive to approve 
responsible proposals, because doing so enhances the political ac-
ceptability of preservation review, eases opposition to expansion of 
the system from additional designations, and allows the municipality 
to avoid costly and embarrassing takings losses. Since the focus 
turns to the economic potential of the site under various proposals, 
llgeorgetown.edulhistpres/papers/papers_dutra.pdf (last viewed May 
1,2004). 
58. Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton 
Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985). 
59. In 900 G St. Assoc., the court stated that "[p]etitioner had the 
burden of proof in the hearing to establish that no other reasonable 
economic use for the Building existed. Since the Act assigned the 
function of taking evidence and making determinations to the 
Mayor's Agent and she heard the testimony in the instant case and 
possessed the administrative expertise, the decision of the Mayor's 
Agent will be upheld by this court in resolving questions of fact 
unless it appears from the record that there is obvious and egregious 
error." 900 G St. Assoc., 430 A.2d at 1392. New York City Land-
mark's Preservation Commission's procedures for owners who want 
to demolish or alter their landmarks has been criticized as burden-
some to owners and biased toward the Commission. !d. at 390; see 
also Moy; supra note 47, at 486. 
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both developers and regulators have a self-interest in finding a com-
promise that retains the visual integrity of the landmark and permits 
useful adaptation. Penn Central seems to have placed us in a prag-
matic workable constitutional context for landmark preservation. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Penn Central nearly always protects historic preservation deci-
sions from takings challenges. Developers rarely bother to contest 
the constitutionality of preservation restraints, but seek to craft pro-
posals that will be approved. This is not that hard, given some archi-
tectural and entrepreneurial imagination. Historic preservation laws 
do not forbid any uses and most historic buildings can be put to 
some valuable use. Historic preservation law has matured under 
these conditions to provide significant control over design and scale 
for much urban development. 
